The 2009 one-off commercial sale of 102 tonnes of stockpiled ivory generated more than $15m that benefitted elephant conservation and local communities. Further such sales were then banned until 2017.

Advocates of the prohibitionist approach argue that this one-off sale has led to increased demand for ivory in Asia and, consequently, stimulated poaching levels in Africa. There is no evidence to support this claim (pdf) despite numerous assertions by animal welfare groups.

Rather, the restrictions under which this one-off sale was permitted might have triggered large-scale poaching of elephants. Market speculators, who probably started investing in raw ivory during the global financial crisis, started stockpiling in anticipation the black-market price would increase because of scarcity during the sale moratorium. Indeed, the black market price of ivory skyrocketed between 2008 and 2014.

In pure economic terms, limiting the supply of ivory can have negative consequences for elephant conservation. Supply reduction, by burning ivory stockpiles and implementing sale moratoria when demand for ivory remains unchanged, can drive prices up and escalate elephant poaching. As the market is controlled by criminals and investors who have no interest in conservation and are influenced primarily by price, elephant poaching can be predicted to increase.

Despite recent investment in demand reduction in Asia, it is unlikely demand will be driven to zero within the short time frame required to save the species from extinction in the wild. A more practical approach would be to combine demand reduction campaigns with a legal and regulated supply of ivory, which would keep the price of ivory from rising higher and reduce the incentives for gangs to kill elephants.

If this doesn?t happen then African countries might choose to withdraw their participation from Cites and decide for themselves what to do with their elephants and other species.

?Legal trade backfired badly in 2008. So why try again??

Dr Nitin Sekar, science policy fellow with the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and Professor Solomon Hsiang, associate professor of public policy at UC Berkeley.

Whether or not legal sales of otherwise illegal products will undercut harmful black markets is a classic question in economics. It seems to have worked when the US repealed the prohibition of alcohol and legal booze flooded markets previously dominated by bootleggers. It?s less clear whether it is working in places that have experimented with legalising marijuana or prostitution. Will it work for ivory? This question pits two sets of economic theories against each other.

In the standard economic model, the best way to prevent poaching is to establish a market for the ivory collected from elephants that have died naturally. Alternatively, in a dynamic economic model where demand and supply can change in response to legalisation, poaching may be worsened by legal ivory trade.

This can happen in two ways. First, the conspicuous trade of legal ivory could draw new consumers. Individuals seeing ivory promotions on TV or their peers making purchases may become more interested in buying some themselves. But this growing demand might not be satisfied by the legal supply, incentivising more poaching. Second, with more legal ivory in circulation, it becomes tougher for authorities to distinguish legal from illegal ivory, reducing the risk of detection for illegal traders. This makes it possible for illegal traders to supply more illegal ivory.

Which of these economic theories is correct? In most black markets, this is a challenging question as they are almost impossible to observe. But thanks to Cites, we have data stretching back to 2003 that provides a window into the shadowy illegal ivory trade. At 79 large sites in 40 countries across Africa and Asia, Cites collects data on how many elephants are poached and how many died naturally. In a recent analysis, we used these data to see which economic model is right.

Using the Cites global poaching data, we examined whether the ?one-time legal sale? of ivory to China and Japan caused changes in global markets for poached ivory.

What we found surprised us: the sale announcement corresponded with an abrupt, global and lasting 65% increase in poaching. These findings are further supported by reports on the ground. With the new influx of legal ivory, the Chinese government promoted the product, the Chinese media trumpeted the investment value of ivory, and a Chinese periodical noted that the one-time sale ?stimulated new consumption instead of slowing down illegal ivory trades?. Asecondary market for legal ivory permits has emerged to help launder illegal ivory.

References: 

All picture credit and information on the argument from a larger perpective can be sourced from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/oct/01/debate-can-legal-ivory-trade-save-elephants